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Abstract
We develop a macroeconomic agent-based model that consists of firms,
banks, unions and households who interact on labour, goods, credit and
interbank markets. The model endogenises pricing decisions by firms,
wage setting by unions and interest rate setting by banks on both firm
and interbank lending. Banks also set leverage targets and precautionary
liquidity buffers on the basis of internal risk models. Our model produces
endogenous fluctuations driven by the pricing behaviour of firms and the
wage setting behaviour of unions. Fluctuations lead to loan defaults which
are exacerbated as lenders reduce lending and charge higher interest rates,
inducing a credit crunch. We also study how making the inter-banking
network more connected affects the key outcomes of the economy and find
that while the flow of funds from surplus banks to firms can be increased,
the latter effect is soon dominated by increasing instability in the real sec-
tor as firms default at higher rates. While the banking sector experiences
fewer defaults as a whole, losses on the interbank market increase as a
source of bank defaults.
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1 Introduction
Following the 2007-2008 crisis, it has come to be widely accepted that price
flexibility and monetary stability are not enough to ensure macroeconomic sta-
bility, and that financial stability needs to be targeted both for its own sake and
as a key component of any macroeconomic framework. In particular, it is now
believed that financial institutions, particularly large banks, have the potential
to generate systemic risk that spills over into the real economy.
An early contribution by Carl Chiarella highlighted precisely these insights:
in (Chiarella et al. (2012)), he showed that the expansion of banking activities
into non-traditional areas such as stock trading can expose both financial mar-
kets and the real economy to instability, even when the central bank undertakes
appropriate monetary policy; by contrast a Fisherian system in which banks
hold 100% reserves against demand deposits and are excluded from stock trad-
ing can support macroeconomic stability while guaranteeing a sufficient loan
supply to businesses.
A key mechanism through which systemic risk operates is balance sheet
contagion, i.e. losses arising in the balance sheet of one institution have the
tendency to spread to other institutions. In recent years agent-based models
(ABMs) have been widely employed to study the channels through which bal-
ance sheet contagion spreads within the financial system and beyond. Here too,
Carl Chiarella has played a pioneering role as one of the first group of economists
to work within this framework, e.g. (Chiarella et al., 2009, 2002).
Three channels for balance sheet contagion have been identified: (1) the
direct ‘knock-on’ effect, as default by one bank creates losses on the balance
sheets of its creditors; (2) an indirect ‘fire sale’ effect, as banks that suffer losses
deleverage by selling off assets, leading to collapsing asset prices that undermine
otherwise liquid and solvent banks; (3) an indirect ‘liquidity hoarding’ effect, as
healthy institutions react to the accumulation of losses in the banking system by
withholding liquidity on the interbank market to their distressed counterparts.
Of these three channels, the last is probably the most important one through
which the interbank market contributes to the spread of financial crises. Indeed,
liquidity hoarding was identified by several authors as a key trigger of the 2007-8
financial and economic crisis, (Allen and Carletti (2008); Heider et al. (2009);
Acharya and Merrouche (2010)). One can argue that precisely because the
interbank market is normally so important in redistributing liquidity within the
banking sector and on to the real economy, when crisis hits it quickly becomes
subject to the reversal of liquidity provision by otherwise sound banks. Yet,
in our opinion, liquidity hoarding has been one of the least studied channels of
contagion, at least within the framework of ABMs.
In this paper, we develop a macroeconomic ABM that incorporates house-
holds and firms who interact with each other on labour and goods markets;
banks that take in deposits from other sectors, lend to firms on a credit market
and to each other on an interbank market, a government which collects taxes,
makes transfer payments and issues debt and a Central Bank that buys govern-
ment debt and acts as lender of last resort to the banking system. Our purpose
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is to model how interbank markets affect the performance of the real sector over
the course of a business cycle and indeed, how they affect the properties of the
cycle itself.
The economy is closed. Credit flows constitute the only feasible mechanism
for exchange, with all transactions concluded via transfers between the bank
balances of agents. Firms and banks are assumed to be price setters. Imperfect
competition arises by the assumption that both goods and lending markets are
subject to matching frictions that limit opportunities for price arbitrage. Agents
are boundedly rational in that they use simple rules-of-thumb to make decisions,
but these rules are updated in light of experience. Another feature of the model
is stock-flow consistency in the sense of Godley (2007), ensuring that value is not
accidentally created or destroyed. Disequilibrium is a possibility in the model:
markets do not clear at every time step, thus rationing might occur and the
short side rule (Be´nassy, 2002) is applied.
The main contribution of the model is in the way it treats the banking
sector. We endogenise banks’ strategies as to how much lending they wish to
undertake at any given time, who they lend to and at what interest rates. To
be precise, banks determine a target leverage ratio on the basis of an expected
shortfall measure which varies with financial market conditions, they prioritise
counter-parties for lending to on the basis of their perceived risk of defaulting
and charge interest rates to those whom they lend to on the basis of both that
perceived risk and their own sense of economic vulnerability, as proxied by their
expected shortfall.
To our knowledge this is the first attempt to determine all three aspects
of bank strategy in a single, unified framework. We find that the model is
capable of generating endogenous business cycles without imposing any external
disturbance. Moreover we find evidence that when financial downturns occur,
banks contribute to them by withholding liquidity from the interbank and credit
markets and seeking higher interest rates on the funds which they choose to
make available. These effects occur via a decrease in the maximum leverage
that banks are willing to undertake and an increase in the interest rates that
they charge on the funds that they do offer for lending. Finally we find that
an increase in interbank connectivity on one hand improves credit to the real
economy but on the other exacerbate liquidity hoarding.
To our knowledge, the ABMs that have been developed thus far can be
broadly categorised into three groups: those that are mainly concerned with the
macroeconomic role of the banking sector as a whole and thus lack the interbank
market as an additional channel for contagion; those that focus primarily on the
interbank market and finally, those that combine elements of the two.
In the first group are the seminal papers of Delli Gatti et al. (2009, 2011);
De Masi and Gallegati (2012); Ashraf et al. (2017). Other papers in this vein
include Assenza et al. (2015); Caiani et al. (2016); van der Hoog and Dawid
(2017); Dosi et al. (2010); Popoyan et al. (2017). These models study contagion
among firms that operate within the real sector as well as between the firms
and banks but do not study the role of the interbank market in magnifying
contagious effects.
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By contrast, papers in the second group either ignore the real macroeconomy
entirely or treat it as an exogenous source of shocks to the banking sector. For
instance in Gabbi et al. (2015) the real sector is considered as a black-box that
demands bank loans and creates exogenous shocks to banks’ deposits, while the
banking sector reacts to these external factors by its own optimal behaviour on
the credit and interbank markets. A similar approach is adopted in Iori et al.
(2006), while Georg (2013); Allen et al. (2009); Montagna and Kok (2013); Lux
(2015); Berardi and Tedeschi (2017) are pure models of interbank networks.
In the last group, Tedeschi et al. (2012) modelled a three sector economy
with goods, credit and interbank markets in order to study the correlation be-
tween bankruptcy cascades and endogenous business cycles. Other contribu-
tions along these lines include Grilli et al. (2014). However, while these papers
do consider both credit and interbank markets they do not endogenise banks’
strategies as we do, neither do they take up the issue of liquidity hoarding as a
specific phenomenon that amplifies losses on the interbank market.
It should also be noted that while several of the papers mentioned above
do assume that lenders follow strategies for screening potential borrowers on
grounds of perceived risk and setting interest rates accordingly, none of them
relates these strategies to the lender’s own perceived vulnerability. An exception
is that of (Delli Gatti et al., 2011) who assume that, controlling for borrower
risk, more financially sound lenders offer lower interest rates as a competitive
strategy. Our own formulation makes this concept more precise, via linking
financial soundness to the concept of expected shortfall which is well known as
both a tool of risk management and as a benchmark for determining capital
adequacy under Basel regulations.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Sect. 2 contains the model
and its underlying assumptions. Results from the simulations are described in
Sect. 3, while Sect. 4 is about the effects of growing interbank connectivity.
Conclusions are in Sect. 5.
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2 The Model
Our macroeconomic model represents a simplified version of the one used in
(Delli Gatti et al., 2011) as far as the structure of final goods production is
concerned, but extends the latter by introducing a detailed model of the inter-
bank market in which loan supplies, selective rationing and interest rates are
all determined endogenously. Additionally we build on Godley (2007) to model
the sectoral structure of the economy.
2.1 Overview
The economy is composed of five types of agents: households, firms, banks,
a government and a central bank (hereafter, CB). The (discrete) numbers of
households, firms and banks are NH , NF , NB respectively. Interactions take
place on different markets: firms and households meet on markets for goods
and for labour, while firms borrow from banks on the credit market and banks
exchange liquidity on the interbank market.1 The CB buys government-issued
bills on the bond market.
The sole role of the government is to make transfer payments to the house-
hold sector, funding these by issuing bills and collecting taxes. The CB generates
liquidity by buying government bills and providing advances to those banks that
require them; it furthermore holds banks’ reserve deposits in its reserve account.
Households work and spend their income, which is made up of wage income,
asset income and transfers on buying consumption goods, adding to their assets
and paying taxes. In the labour market, households are represented by unions
in their wage negotiations with firms, while on the capital market, they own
firms and banks, receiving a share of profits as part of their asset income.
Firms borrow from banks in order to pay their wage bills in advance, hire
workers, produce and sell their output on the goods market.
The banking sector provides credit to firms, subject to regulatory con-
straints. In each period every bank tries to anticipate its liquidity needs and
accesses the interbank market as a lender or a borrower, thus the interbank
market works as a mechanism to ensure the proper flow of credit to the real
economy. If a bank is short of liquidity, it seeks an advance from the CB.
This section contains some general specifications of the model, i.e. the tim-
ing, matching mechanisms in the goods, credit and interbank markets, and the
maturity structure of loans to the firm sector. Sections 2.2-2.7 describe in detail
the behaviour of each class of agents and their respective balance sheets.
1There is no market for deposits. We assume that each bank has a fixed and equal number
of depositors.
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Figure 1: Diagram of the macro-financial framework.
2.1.1 Timing
The sequence of events in the model is described below.
1. The interbank market opens: demand and supply are respectively deter-
mined by the difference between a bank’s expected liquidity target and its
actual liquidity.
2. Banks compute the expected shortfall based on observed losses and choose
their maximum credit supply. Firms decide their planned hiring and pro-
duction levels, and use these to compute their credit demand.
3. The credit market opens: each bank computes the interest rate charged
to each possible borrower. Firms enter the market and seek out potential
lenders, sorting banks in ascending order of the interest rates that they
charge.
4. The labour market operates and production takes place. Firms compute
their labour demand in line with their planned output levels. They hire
workers on the basis of a frictional matching process and all employed
workers are paid the same wage, which is set each period by a union.
5. Households spend their consumption budget, starting from sellers that
charge lower prices.
6. Firms and banks that obtain positive profits pay taxes and distribute
dividends. They update the dividend share.
7. A loop cycle accounts for potential cascades of bankruptcies in the firms
and banks sectors.
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8. The credit and the interbank markets close. Firms and banks settle their
obligations.
9. The government collects tax revenues and issues bills, which are bought
by the Central Bank. Unions update their required wage rate following a
Phillips rule.
10. Bankrupt firms are replaced with newborn start-ups. Banks are recapi-
talized by their creditors.
2.1.2 The matching mechanisms, network structure and maturity of
loans
The matching mechanism Consumers and firms interact on the goods mar-
ket, firms and banks on the credit market, while banks exchange liquidity with
each other on the interbank market. A network structure of linkages between
buyers and sellers determines the interaction in each market.
A simple matching process operates in the goods market, where each house-
hold observes a subset of firms in a random order, sorts them in ascending order
and spends its consumption budget, starting from the cheapest ones. The pro-
cess ends once the budget is exhausted or the household has visited all the firms
in its subset. The potential out-degree of the consumer nodes in the network is
equal to the number of firms in the system, since each household is linked to all
the firms, but can visit only a fraction of them at each round of interactions.
This friction is introduced in order to model search costs.
The parameter Fh ∈ (0, 1] determines the share of sellers that can be visited
by each household at the opening of the market. If Fh = 1, meaning that each
household can visit all the firms, they would spend their entire consumption
budget at the cheapest sellers, while the most expensive firms would be unable
to sell all their goods. On the other hand, for low values of Fh, when just a small
sample of firms can be visited, the buyers are likely to end up not exhausting
their budgets, although the most expensive sellers could sell more than in the
previous case. Thus there is a tradeoff between demand rationing and unsold
output, depending on the value of Fh.
Interbank and credit markets work with a simple matching mechanism,
where each borrower observes a subset of potential partners, choosing the lender
according to the interest rate asked. Borrowers in turn are sorted in ascending
order with respect to their default probabilities, so that the more risky banks
are the first to be rationed in case the loan supply is not enough to meet total
demand. The rationale of this simple rule is to allow banks to limit their expo-
sure by rationing those agents that are more likely to be insolvent, when there
is contraction in credit supply. The number of potential partners is determined
by the network topology, which is fixed during each simulation.
The network topology The financial topology of the system is composed by
a set of interrelated networks. We model the firm-bank credit network, deposit
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networks and the interbank market. The former two are bipartite graphs: the
firm-bank credit network allows firms to link to banks in the credit market,
while the deposit networks determine in which banks households and firms hold
their deposits, subject to the condition that each depositor can have at most
one link. Banks are coupled with other banks in the interbank network.
In order to match the empirical evidence on interbank networks (see for
instance Iori et al., 2008), we assume that few banks are connected to many
depositors, i.e. they have available loanable funds, but at the same time they
experience low credit demand because of scarce investment opportunities, i.e.
low out-degree on the credit market. On the other side banks with a high out-
degree on the credit market face large credit demand from firms, but they have
low funds. For the first group it is profitable to lend liquidity to the other one
through the interbank market, while the second group prefers to borrow funds
in order to lend to the real sector. Moreover the interbank network has a core-
periphery structure, similar to those observed in real world networks: nodes in
high supply of liquidity are the peripheral ones, while the core of the network
is composed by net lenders that are also characterized by greater dimensions in
terms of equity. The generation process and detailed networks statistics can be
found in Appendix. 6.D. Although the overall structure is static, it reduces the
complexity of the system for the purposes of this article; a more realistic set-up
of the network structure and its implications for the economy will be examined
in further research.
The structure of maturities The introduction of a heterogeneous structure
of maturities of firm-bank loans is a new feature in this family of ABM. It as-
sumes that firms have only intermittent access to the credit market at intervals
of time that differ in length across firms. This leads to heterogeneity in bank
portfolios, even though banks operate in the credit market at each time. We
assume a random maturity length of loans for each firm, ranging from a min-
imum to a maximum possible duration (see Appendix 6A), which is assigned
each time a firm enters the credit market to seek credit or when the firm is
revived in case of default. Furthermore we add a couple of simplifying assump-
tions. First, in case a firm borrows multiple loans during a session of the credit
market, the maturity is equal across all of them, since the maturity depends on
the next time the firm can access the market. Second, the negotiated interest
rates between banks and firms are unrelated to the length of loans.2
2 The expectations theory of term structure implies this outcome so long as creditors expect
short-term interest rates to remain constant or change unpredictably. By contrast, the liquidity
preference theory argues that interest rates should increase with maturity even if expected
short-term rates are stationary. This is because long maturity loans bear greater market risk
arising from volatility of short-term interest rates and market risk reduces the value of debt
securities on secondary loan markets. While acknowledging this debate, our main interest
is in how banks take into account their own fragility and the credit risk imposed by their
borrowers, rather than the market-based risks that liquidity preference theory is concerned
with. In our model there are no secondary markets for debt (or for that matter, equity) so all
loans are held till maturity. For this reason we opt for the above simplifying assumption.
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2.2 Households
The household sector consists of NH units indexed by i. Households work, buy
consumption goods and save. All households supply equal amounts of labour
and own equal shares in banks and firms. Each household also has a deposit
account at some bank, initialised to be identical across households, whereas each
bank has an equal number of households with accounts in it. In case of default,
households use their deposits to recapitalize firms or banks, while as depositors
they may lose a part of their savings after the default of their creditor bank.3
The net worth of the i-th household is defined as the value of deposits kept
in a bank account.4
nwHi,t = D
H
i,t (1)
Households receive their income from wages, interest on deposits and div-
idends. The law of motion of deposits is given by the accounting equation
(2), which states that the variation in the deposits from t − 1 to t, defined
∆Dt ≡ Dt − Dt−1, is given by the interest rate rD on deposits at time t − 1,
plus worked hours NH times the wage rate W , net of the tax rate θ, plus the
constant dividend share δk on net profits of owned firms and banks (1− θ)Πk,
with k = f, b, minus consumption. Moreover there is an exogenous fiscal compo-
nent G, which consists of transfers to the household sector, such that everyone
receives the same amount G
NH
, which adds to the disposable income.
Thus, in any period t, household i′s savings are equal to
SHi,t = D
H
i,t−1r
D + (1− θ)
Wt−1NHi,t−1 + ∑
k=f,b
δkΠki,t−1
− Ci,t−1 + G
NH
(2)
Savings are identically equal to the change in the value of bank deposits,
since these are the only stores of wealth in this model.
SHi,t = ∆D
H
i,t
The equation of consumption resembles a permanent income rule (see Modigliani
and Brumberg, 1954) that states that households consume a fraction c1 of their
current labour income and a fraction c2 of their wealth. In nominal terms:
5
3 Households play a secondary role in this paper; unlike firms and banks we do not endow
them with strategic decision-making. At the same time, households are needed in order to
complete the payment and expenditure cycle of a macro-economy and it is in this spirit that
we assume that they collectively and equally own profit-making entities, and that they share
in the costs of capitalising new entities, as these represent flows of income and expenditure
within the system.
4 Households’ net wealth also includes the values of shares in firms and banks. However,
these components of net wealth cannot be explicitly valued since there are no secondary stock
markets in the present generation of this model, nor are credit markets open to borrowing by
households. Shares in businesses therefore only carry implicit value and are excluded from
the computation of net wealth.
5 The assumption that consumption follows a linear rule in relation to available resources is
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Cdi,t = c1
[
(1− θ)WtNHi,t +
G
NH
]
+ c2D
H
i,t (3)
It is worth noting that (3) represents a consumption budget that each house-
hold wishes to spend during a given period. If a household is rationed on the
goods market, such involuntary saving increases its stock of deposits.
2.3 The labour market
Each household supplies one unit of labour inelastically, making the total labor
force equal to NH . However, due to hiring frictions that will be described later,
there are at any time t only Nˆt ≤ NH employable workers. All employable
workers are available to work at a wage determined by unions so that the actual
number of employed will be determined by the demand for labour by firms,
which in turn is in proportion to their available liquidity.
The reason that not all workers are employable at any given time arises
because worker productivity depends on both a fixed productivity parameter,
α and a multiplicative match-specific shock i,j that arises when worker i meets
firm j that is independently and identically distributed across all worker-firm
pairs, with i,j = 1 with probability p and i,j = 0 with probability (1 − p).
Thus
αi,j = αi,j =
{
α with probability p
0 with probability (1− p)
}
This friction generates persistence in the time path of unemployment. Unem-
ployment arises as firms fire their workers, and is not immediately eliminated
despite the emergence of new firms, due to matching friction. Each job seeker
can meet a subset n of prospective employers in a given period but meetings
need not result in a vacancy being filled.6
made to approximate household behaviour via a simple rule of thumb. Bank-to-bank and firm-
to-bank interactions are the main concern of this paper. We acknowledge that both theory
and empirical evidence suggests that the consumption function might be far more complex
and subject to discontinuities and non-linearities (see Carroll (2001) for a review article). At
the same time, it has been argued that simple linear rules of thumb might closely approximate
optimal consumption behaviour (Allen and Carroll (2001)). In future work when household
behaviour becomes more the focus of analysis, we shall explore more sophisticated formulations
for generating consumption choices: for example, the marginal propensity to consume out of
available resources could go up in booms and down in recessions as precautionary savings
adapt to the business cycle.
6 Match-specific frictions are widely used in the job search literature to create frictional
unemployment. Postel-Vinay and Turon (2010), for example, assume that worker productiv-
ity is the product of a fixed parameter that is identical across workers and a match-specific
shock that varies across worker-employer pairs. One way to conceive of a match-specific shock
is that it measures mutual compatibility between the employer and his/her workers. In order
for a worker to achieve their potential productivity they must ‘get along’ with their employer.
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Given that the (simple) probability of “success” in any given interview is p,
the probability of k successful interviews in n trials is given by
p(s) =
n!
k!(n− k)!p
k(1− p)n−k;
where s stands for success. Setting n = 2, k = 1 this boils down to
p(s) = 2p(1− p)
Furthermore we arbitrarily assume that p = 0.6 so the probability of “success”
is p(s) = 0.48.
A candidate who is compatible might be hired depending on the firm’s de-
mand for labour. If aggregate labour demand is lower than the available number
of workers Nˆt, each firm can hire its desired labour demand. Otherwise it is
assumed that firms hire in proportion to their demands with respect to the total
labour demand, so that full employment cannot be exceeded.7
We assume that the union adjusts the wage rate sluggishly, based on an
adaptive mechanism, in order to prevent the wage time series jumping up or
down sharply. The adjustment takes into account a simple moving average of
past realized values of inflation (pˆip) and unemployment(uˆ) over the last τw
periods. The wage inflation rate piw ≡ WtWt−1 is (see Fazzari et al., 2008)
piwt = pˆi
p
t − σ1(uˆt − u∗)− σ2(uˆt − uˆt−1) (4)
with pˆip ≡ PtPt−1 the price inflation rate computed on the average price level,
uˆt is the unemployment rate, u
∗ is the average unemployment rate that would
prevail if the economy were to evolve without cycles. The term σ2(uˆt − uˆt−1)
represents the effect of the change of unemployment on the wage inflation rate.
It entails a trend rise or a decline in the wage inflation, thus affecting the
persistence of the adjustment process. This effect has been backed by empirical
and theoretical works (Layard et al., 2005; McMorrow, 1996).
2.4 Government and the central bank
The roles of government and the CB are crucial to understand the logic of the
model. Every agent tries to achieve a positive net worth, except the government
and CB. The former is always in debt with the CB and the latter has zero net
worth. According to the aggregate balance sheet identity for the whole economy,
the negative net worth of the government is balanced by the positive net worth
7 For instance, if Nˆt = 100 and
NF∑
j=1
Ndj = 120, with N
d
1 = 30, then firm 1 can hire
Nd1∑
j
Ndj
Nˆt = 25 units of labour. Otherwise, if
∑
j
Ndj < Nˆt, the constraint is not binding and
firm 1 can hire all its labour demand.
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of the private sectors so that aggregate net worth is zero (see Appendix 6.B.1
for further details).∑
i∈NH
nwHi,t +
∑
j∈NF
nwFj,t +
∑
h∈NB
nwBh,t + nw
G
t = 0
Government bills are sold directly to the CB. They have one-period matu-
rity and pay an interest rate rB . The government’s budget constraint can be
expressed in the single equation
∆Bt = Bt+1 −Bt = rBBt +G− Tt −ΠCBt (5)
where Bt is the outstanding stock of government bills at time t, G are (constant)
transfers to households, Tt are tax revenues and Π
CB
t are the profits of the CB,
repatriated to the government. The expenditure on transfers is assumed to
be exogenous. In each period a part of the aggregate demand consists of G,
which in turn is financed with the money created by the CB. This particular
mechanism is known as a pure auto-economy in Hicks et al. (1974, p. 51) and
is detailed in Godley (2007, chap. 2).
The circuit starts when government issues bills that are bought by the CB.
The funds raised from this sale are transferred to the household sector’s bank
accounts. The firm sector borrows funds from banks, pays workers to produce
and then sells the goods to households. Firms then deposit revenues from sales
in banks. Notice that banks are creditors of the CB, since the high powered
money on their account can be asked by firms at any time and in turn can be
claimed by them from the CB. The circuit closes once taxes are collected by the
government and firms repay loans.
The governmental deficit is countercyclical, acting as a stabilizer. During
bad times tax collections are low, so the amount of liquidity in the system
increases by the budget deficit due to the constant level of public expenditure.
In good times, when Tt > G+ r
BBt, the stock of bills is lowered and the excess
liquidity is destroyed. In this simple setting we do not assume any limit to the
stock of public debt or debt/GDP ratio. The event of a spiral driven by interest
on outstanding debt is ruled-out by Eq. 5, as profit of the CB are transferred
to the government. Additionally the stock of bills cannot grow indefinitely
because public transfers increase the budget of households, which in turn is
spent in consumption goods, thus governmental deficit helps the economy to
recover from the crisis. Finally when the crisis is beyond, money in the balance
of agents collected with taxes and the stock of debt decreases.
The profits of the CB are given by the interest payment on advances A, bills
B and reserves R:
ΠCBt = At−1r
H +Bt−1rB −Rt−1rL (6)
Interest rates on advances rH and reserves rL are fixed and form the corridor
through which lending to firms and banks takes place.
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Furthermore the CB acts as a lender of last resort, providing liquidity to the
banking sector. Its behaviour is described with respect to bank h by
∆Ah,t = −min(Rh,t + I lh,t − rrDh,t − Ibh,t, Ah,t−1) (7)
When a solvent bank h has liquidity (taking into account interbank lending
I l and interbank borrowing Ib) that exceeds the advances due to the CB, i.e.
Rh,t + I
l
h,t − rrDh,t − Ibh,t ≥ Ah,t−1 it extinguishes the debt Ah,t−1. If instead
At−1,h is greater or equal than Rh,t+I lh,t−rrDh,t−Ibh,t the bank either refunds
a part of the debt (Rh,t + I
l
h,t − rrDh,t − Ibh,t > 0) or borrows (Rh,t + I lh,t −
rrDh,t − Ibh,t < 0).
2.5 The business sector
There are NF firms indexed by j that produce an homogeneous good using
labour alone. In order to hire workers, firms need to pay the wage bill in
advance. We assume that this cash-in-advance constraint always binds so that
firms can only hire up to the point where available liquidity allows.8
The balance sheet of a firm is composed of bank deposits DF on the asset
side while liabilities consist of loans L.9
nwFt = D
F
t − LFt (8)
Each period, firms make their decisions in the following sequence: (1) set a
target output level from which they calculate a labour target; (2) seek financing
by borrowing if needed (subject to access to the credit market in that period)
in order to meet the expected wage bill; (3) hire workers until the wage bill has
been met or no further employable workers can be found, then produce; (4) set
a price for their output and attempt to sell it.
2.5.1 Quantity:
Firm j’s output and labour demand choices at each time step t are determined
by the following set of equations:
Y targetj,t =
{
Y sj,t−1(1− χj) if Yj,t−1 < Y sj,t−1
Y sj,t−1(1 + χj) if Yj,t−1 = Y
s
j,t−1
(9)
8Absent this constraint, firms could have an indeterminate demand for labour because of
(i) the linearity of the production technology, (ii) the exogeneity of the wage rate to their
hiring decisions and (iii) their ability to manipulate the price of their own product.
9 Inventories are not included as they are assumed to fully depreciate each period. These
assumptions, which are in line with Delli Gatti et al. (2011), rule out business cycle driven
by the accumulation of unsold inventories. Rather they allow for business cycles arising from
variations in business expectations driven by variations in sales.
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where:
Y target ≡ target output; Y s ≡ actual output, Y ≡ actual sales and χ ≡ op-
timism/pessimism coefficient regarding future sales. In other words, if firm j
manages to sell all its output in a given period it adjusts its target output for
the next period above its output in the given period and if it has unsold output
it adjusts its target output to be less than its output in the given period.
The firm’s labour target directly follows from the output target.
N targetj,t =
1
α
Y targetj,t (10)
where N target ≡ labour target calculated at the output target. The question
is whether and how this demand will be financed under the cash-in-advance
constraint on the labour market.
2.5.2 Credit demand and the evolution of liquidity
On the basis of the target output and employment, firms calculate a target wage
bill and try to ensure that enough liquidity is available to finance it. They first
use their own available resources and go to the credit market to borrow any
excess. Since they can access the credit market only intermittently, on each
visit they have to calculate a loan target which covers financing needs over the
entire maturity of the loan.
Whether or not a firm can enter the credit market at some time t, it calculates
a loan target for that t, as a weighted average of a cumulative loan target and a
current financing need in that period t. The loan target accumulates according
to
Ltargetj,t = βL
target
j,t−1 + (1− β)
(
WtN
target
j,t − ζnwFj,t
)
(11)
where Ltarget is a loan target, nwF is the net worth of the firm and β is a
smoothing factor. Note that the self-financing portion of the wage bill comprises
the firm’s net worth at any time t and not its bank deposits DFj,t. This is because
it has to ensure enough liquidity to pay off any liabilities from the last period
of borrowing. ζ ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter that weighs the relative priority given to
internal finance (ζ = 1) over borrowing (ζ = 0) for meeting operational needs.10
If the firm enters the market at some t = {s, 2s, 3s . . .}, where s is the interval
of time between visits to the credit market, its loan demand is given by
Ldj,t = L
target
j,t
To see how the loan target evolves in between visits to the credit market,
consider what happens at t+ 1, i.e. the time period immediately following the
10 The choice of ζ depends on striking a balance between the lower cost of internal finance
(as suggested by pecking-order theory) and the tax advantages of debt finance (as argued by
trade-off theory) plus the need to maintain positive net worth as collateral in case of future
borrowing. In the simulation we set ζ = 0.8 which is close to the benchmark of pecking-
order theory. Lower values of ζ were found to affect outcomes in the financial sector without
changing the dynamics of the real economy very significantly.
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visit to the credit market. Suppose that s = 1, where s is the interval between
visits to the credit market. In that case, the firms loan target would be given
by
Ltargetj,t+1 = (1− β)
(
Wt+1N
target
j,t+1 − ζnwFj,t+1
)
;
Now suppose that s = 2, so that the firm can borrow every other period.
In that case, it would carry over its loan target from t + 1 and add to that its
liquidity need for t+ 2.
Ltargetj,t+2 = βL
target
j,t+1 + (1− β)
(
Wt+2N
target
j,t+2 − ζnwFj,t+2
)
Iterating this forward for any integer value of s we arrive at the formulation
above. Note that the next time the firm enters the credit market, its loan
demand will be
Ldj,t+s = L
target
j,t+s
and Ltargetj,t+s+1 = 0 and the process repeats itself.
Since a firm might be rationed on the credit market, its actual loan might
be less than its loan demand
Lj,t ≤ Ldj,t
Once a loan has been obtained, it is added to the firm’s deposit account, which
is updated as
DFj,t = nw
F
j,t + Lj,t (12)
implying that the funds are immediately available to spend. Note that in any
period in which the firm is in the credit market its past liabilities must be cleared
before new loans can be used to finance its wage bill. Thus at the time a new
loan is taken out. In addition, between t and t + s the outgoings are on wage
payments, taxes, dividends and interest payments on the loan.
Thus, between t+ 1 and t+ s, DFj evolves as
DFj,t+i = D
F
j,t+i−1(1 + r
D)−WtNj,t+i−1 + Pj,tYj,t+i−1 − [taxes + dividends +
interest payments at time t+ i− 1]
i = {1, . . . s}
where N and Y are labour hired and output sold while P is the price of output.
These are addressed in the following subsections as are the tax and dividend
payments.
2.5.3 Hiring and Production
Once the firm has secured a loan and updated its liquidity, it determines an
expected wage bill, Ω by balancing its planned outputs against its available
funds.
Ωj,t = min
[
DFj,t,WtN
target
j,t ]
]
(13)
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Because of frictions on the labour market, a firm might not manage to hire
all its budgeted workers:
Nj,t ≤ Ωj,t
Wt
where Nj,t is the actual employment of firm j. From here we get the actual
output supplied.
Y sj,t = αNj,t (14)
2.5.4 Pricing
Each firm has some monopoly power since search costs prevent all consumers
to sample all firms each time. This implies that a firm can charge a price
higher than its marginal costs. However, firms that charge lower prices increase
their market share. The pricing mechanism is a delicate job that may affect
the outcome of the model: in principle a good pricing rule would clear the
market at each time, but this ideal condition cannot be always satisfied, indeed
shifts in the consumption budget of households, the cost structure and bounded
rationality prevent firms from setting the market clearing price.
As in Dosi et al. (2013), we assume that firms use their previous market
share to compute the price they charge by adding a mark-up on their costs of
production. The mark-up charged by firm j at time t, µj,t, follows the rule
µj,t = µj,t−1 (1 + ∆yj,t−1) (15)
where yj represents firm j’s market share, expressed as the ratio of j’s sales to the
market sales from the previous period. The change in the market share between
the previous two periods is denoted by ∆yj,t−1 = yj,t−1 − yj,t−2. According to
the rule, each firm computes the most recently observed change in market share,
then forms an expectation about the mark-up it can apply: if the difference is
positive, the past price could be raised by an amount proportional to the size of
the increase, otherwise price is too high with respect to competitors and should
be reduced. Those firms that went bankrupt during the previous period start
with a mark-up equal to the initial one and reset their memory with respect to
past market shares.
Individual price is then determined as:
Pj,t = (1 + µj,t)ucj,t (16)
The cost of producing one unit is ucj,t is defined as the ratio of wage bill to
j’s output.
ucj,t =
WtNj,t
Y sj,t
(17)
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Following the time-line of the model, after production and pricing took place,
the goods market opens and consumers spend their consumption budget follow-
ing the matching mechanism described in Sect. 2.1.2. The output sold by firm
j is denoted by Yj . The firm’s gross profits Π
F are given by
ΠFj,t = Pj,tYj,t −WtNj,t +DFj,t−1rD −
Nb∑
h=1
rfjh,t−kLjh,t−k (18)
where t − k refers to a loan taken k periods before k = 1 . . . s. In words, gross
profits equal sales revenues minus wage costs and interest charges. If ΠFj,t > 0
the firm pays taxes and dividends, otherwise it absorbs the losses. Net profits
equal gross profits minus taxes imposed at the rate θ. A share δft of net profits
is distributed as dividends, with this share composed of two parts: a direct
component δf and a component that depends on the net worth of the firm
relative to its after-tax profits.
δft = δ
f + ∂F
nwFj.t
(1− θ)ΠFj,t
This formulation prevents firms becoming too large on the basis of retained
earnings, as it tends to increase overall dividends when net worth is rising and
lower them when net worth is falling. With this dividend policy the firm’s net
worth evolves according to
nwFj,t = (1− ∂f )nwFj,t−1 + (1− θ)(1− δf )ΠFj,t−1 (19)
If nwFj,t ≥ 0 the firm’s debt can be serviced, otherwise the firm is insolvent at
the end of the period and bankruptcy occurs.
2.6 The banking sector
There are NB banks, indexed by h. They finance themselves with short-term
liabilities and provide loans with longer maturities to the real sector. In case
they have an excess or a shortage of liquidity, they exchange it on the interbank
market or borrow from the CB in case of rationing.11
The asset side of their balance sheet includes outstanding loans to firms,
indexed by j and banks, indexed by q, denoted respectively by L and I l, plus
11It is worth noticing that the banking sector cannot finance itself without limits just by
creating new deposits by lending to firms. Rather money is controlled by the CB that finances
government’s expenditure. Banks can provisionally anticipate liquidity to firms, then they
access the interbank market to retrieve funds and comply with prudential regulation. The
overall liquidity of the banking system correspond to the money supply of CB, hence if the
interbank market is frictionless, money is never created by banks but they lend the existing
funds to firms. If there are frictions on the interbank market, an illiquid bank can obtain a
loan from the CB, but it will pay it back as soon as it finds a cheaper source of liquidity, for
instance substituting CB’s funds with interbank loans.
17
liquidity R. Liabilities could include banks’ own funds and external liabilities,
such as interbank borrowing Ib towards creditors, indexed by z, deposits DB
and advances A from the CB.
Bank h’s net worth is given by:
nwBh,t = Rh,t +
J∑
j=1
Lhj,t−kj +
Q∑
q=1
I lhq,t−1 −DBh,t −Ah,t −
Z∑
z=1
Ibzh,t−1 (20)
where kj is the maturity of outstanding loans held by firm j.
At the beginning of each period banks face credit requests from firms and
try to serve these in full, while respecting the regulatory constraints. A bank
h can supply up to the maximum amount allowed by the regulator net of the
outstanding stock of loans.12
Lsh,t = λnw
B
h,t −
J∑
j=1
Lhj,t−kj −
Q∑
q=1
I lhq,t−1 (21)
The credit market matches firms with a predetermined number of banks
(see Sect. 2.1.2). A generic firm chooses to take the loan out from that bank
in its own subset that offers the lowest interest rate. Each bank charges an
interest rate, taking into account their counter-party risk and their own cost
of funds, leading to heterogeneous interest rates. Furthermore, banks prefer to
extend loans to borrowers in order of increasing default probabilities, so that
risky firms are more likely to be rationed in case the supply is insufficient.
Eq. (22) describes the default risk ρft,hj perceived by bank h for firm j:
ρft,hj = 1− e−v(`jESh,t) (22)
The default probability is an increasing function of borrower j′s leverage rate
`j , corrected for the financial vulnerability perceived by bank h at time t, in
terms of its own expected shortfall, ESh,t. The latter accounts for the fact that
an increase in bank h’s vulnerability due to greater expected losses induces it to
place greater weight on the risk created by a given default. As will be clearer in
the next paragraph, this mechanism amplifies negative sentiments regarding the
economy by raising interest rates when non performing loans increase, therefore
deteriorating credit conditions and lowering the net worth of firms, increasing
the likelihood of further defaults. Although constructed differently, this mech-
anism resembles in a broad sense the network-based financial accelerator as a
mechanism to amplify shocks (Delli Gatti et al., 2010).
12The prudential constraint states that the stock of loans to net worth ratio cannot exceed
a parameter λ:
Lt
nwBt
≤ λ
Define the loan supply as the change in the stock of loans
Lt = Lt−1 + Lst
then by substitution: Lst = λnw
B
t − Lt−1.
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The interest rate at which bank h offers to lend funds to firm j is denoted by
rft,hj . It is a function of the cost of funds and j’s specific probability of default.
rft,hj =
1 + cfh,t
1− ρfj,t
− 1 (23)
where cfh,t is bank h
′s cost of funds, given by
cfh,t = ω
D
h,tr
D + ωAh,tr
H + ωIh,tr
b
t−k,h (24)
The cost of funds depends on the composition of the bank’s liabilities, with ωih,t
representing the share of each source of liquidity (deposits, advances, interbank
borrowing) over liabilities.
ωih,t =
ih,t
DBh,t +Ah,t + I
b
h,t
i = DB , A, Ib (25)
Gross profits ΠBh,t are
ΠBh,t = Rh,t−1r
L +
J∑
j=1
LFhj,t−kjr
f
hj,t−kj +
Q∑
q=1
I lhq,t−1r
b
hq,t−1 −Ah,t−1rH −Dh,t−1rD
(26)
If positive, these are subject to taxes at the rate θ, then the fixed share δb is
distributed to shareholders.
The loss for a bank in case of a default by firm j at time t is equal to the
stock of loans outstanding to the firm, minus the debt that can be serviced in
case of default. In other words it is the difference between the stock of loans
and the firm’s own deposits, i.e. the (negative) net worth of the defaulted firm.
lossFt,hj = L
F
j,t−kj −DFj,t = −nwFj,t;
with nwFj,t ≤ 0.
Things are slightly more complex in case of an interbank default, indeed
a bank has more than one creditor, including depositors, the CB and other
banks. Moreover it is assumed that the asset portfolios of defaulting banks
remain intact, as they are recapitalised after default. In other words, there are
no fire sales of assets. Each creditor of the defaulting bank claims its share of
residual assets in proportion to its claims on the defaulter’s aggregate liabilities
Lt,q, as will be detailed in sect. 2.7. A creditor bank h then loses a part of its
loan to the failed bank q according to:
lossBt,hq =
I lhq
Lt,q nw
B
t,q
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It is worth noting that contagion can arise. If a borrower defaults, the creditor
bank may become insolvent and go into bankruptcy as well, triggering a series
of bankruptcies or losses on the interbank and credit markets.
The net worth of bank h updates with the retained profits minus the losses:
∆nwBh,t = (1− θ)(1− δb)ΠBh,t −
J∑
j=1
lossFt,hj −
Q∑
q=1
lossBt,hq (27)
Finally, in order to understand the change in liquidity, the accounting equa-
tion describing the law of motion of R is reported below. Here ∆Lh,t indicates
the change between t− 1 and t of loans in both credit and interbank markets.
∆Rh,t = ∆D
B
h,t + ∆Ah,t −∆Lh,t + (1− θ)(1− δ)ΠBh,t −
J∑
j=1
lossFt,hj −
Q∑
q=1
lossBt,hq
(28)
2.6.1 Minimum capital requirement and financial leverage
We adopt a simplified version of Basel III regulatory constraints. In detail we
suppose that banks must comply with a minimum capital requirement (solvency
ratio) and a financial leverage ratio.
The minimum capital requirement (MCR) implies that the ratio of net
worth:weighted assets must be greater than a parameter φ, where the weight
is given by the expected shortfall (ES) computed by each bank depending upon
past losses in line with the Basel framework. The ES is computed as the average
of the value of losses on the overall portfolio of the bank, exceeding the historical
VAR over the last n periods at 97.5% confidence level. In other words the ES
represents the expected percentage loss on the portfolio in worst case scenarios
(occurring with probability 2.5% or less), over the last n observed periods.13
Thus
nwBh,t ≥ φtESh,t
 J∑
j=1
LFhj,t−kj +
Z∑
z=1
I lt−1,hz

If the net capital of a bank h is lower than the potential losses on the loan
portfolio, h is in violation of its MCR. This means that its portfolio is too
risky, or its financial leverage rate is too high. As a response, h attempts to
move to a safer position by de-leveraging until its capital complies with the
13The losses over loans ratio is preferred to the absolute losses approach, as the latter
would be a wrong signal if the relative size of the actual portfolio respect to the one used in
the computation of ES changes over time. If this is the case, the bank should deleverage even
when its stock of loans is lower than ES.
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prudential rules. This is done by reducing its credit supply and by not renewing
the outstanding loans.
The condition above can be rewritten in form of a leverage rate:∑J
j=1 L
F
hj,t−k +
∑Z
z=1 I
l
t−1,hz
nwBh,t
≤ 1
φtESh,t
In parallel with minimum capital requirements, banks must comply with a max-
imum financial leverage, by which they cannot exceed a threshold λ, set by the
regulator uniformly across all banks.∑J
j=1 L
F
hj,t−k +
∑Z
z=1 I
l
t−1,hz
nwBh,t
≤ λ
It follows that a bank may increase its leverage up to a maximum threshold
λmax, depending on which constraint is stricter:
λmaxh,t = min
(
1
φtESh,t
, λ
)
So long as the statutory constraint is not binding, the maximum leverage
ratio will change in response to ES, meaning that when expected losses are high,
λmax will be low and so on.
The loan supply in eq. (21) can be rewritten with λmax in place of λ
Lsh,t = λ
max
h,t nw
B
h,t −
J∑
j=1
Lhj,t−kj −
Q∑
q=1
I lhq,t−1 (29)
2.6.2 The interbank market
The interbank market is the place where banks exchange liquidity, mutually
protecting themselves against the risk of shortages. At the opening of the market
banks exchange funds in order to have a buffer of liquidity large enough to face
outflows during the period, that originate from changes in the balance sheets of
other agents, for instance defaults of firms, withdrawals etc.14
Fig. 2 shows a stylized time-line of the interbank market. During each period
there are three different sessions of the interbank market, each one takes place
in conjunction with the main changes in banks’ deposits occurring in the model.
At each interbank session banks try to anticipate how much liquidity they need
to avoid shortages until the closing of the market, thus they form a liquidity
target that is determined on the basis of each bank’s specific characteristics.
After a session it might be the case that a bank has not enough liquidity to
reach its target. In such circumstances it asks an advance at the CB (see Eq.
14In our approach banks form an internal liquidity coverage ratio based on their individual
characteristics. As an alternative banks might enter the interbank market to comply with a
prudential liquidity coverage ratio, as under Basel III (see Popoyan et al., 2017).
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Figure 2: Timeline of the interbank market (IB).
7), which exposes it to the highest interest rate costs of all the possible sources
of funds.
At the end the market closes and banks settle their positions.
To assess the needed liquidity, a bank h computes a liquidity ratio (LR),
defined as
LRh,t =
Rh,t − rrDBh,t
liqtagh,t
≥ 1
The numerator is the liquidity held at the CB net of the compulsory reserve
ratio on deposits. In the denominator liqtag represents the liquidity buffer, that
is the difference between expected cash outflows outE and inflows inE of a bank
during a single period. LR must be greater or equal than one.
The liquidity buffer of bank h is defined as
liqtagh,t = out
E
t+1,h − inEt+1,h (30)
The expected cash outflows consist of the payment of interest rates on de-
posits plus their run-off rate, that is assumed to be the standard deviation to
deposits ratio over the last 50 periods, plus the advances borrowed from the CB
and the relative interest rate15.
outEh,t+1 = (r
D + rorh,t)D
B
h,t + (1 + r
H)Ah,t
The expected cash inflows are given by the sum of interest payments on loans
by the subset of firms j, plus the principal of loans that will be paid back at the
end of t by borrowers V weighted by their default probabilities, plus the interest
paid by the CB on reserves. It is worth noticing that banks form an expectation
about their liquidity need, based on the state of the economy, which is reflected
by the default probabilities of borrowers. When losses are large, their desired
liquidity is larger than during periods of stability.
inEh,t+1 =
∑
j∈J
Lhj,tr
f
hj,t−kj +
∑
v∈V
(1− ρfhv,t)Lhv,t + rLRh,t
15Given the sequence of events in the interbank market, a bank that borrowed from the CB
prefers to pay back the advance and to resort to interbank liquidity, rather than to roll over
the loan at unfavourable interest rate
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At each session of the interbank market, if the liquidity is below the buffer,
bank h enters the interbank market as a borrower; otherwise it enters as a
lender. Interbank demand and supply are described in Eq.s (31)-(32).16
Idh,t = liq
tag
h,t − (Rh,t − rrDBh,t) (31)
Ish,t = min
Rh,t − rrDBh,t − liqtagh,t , λmaxh,t nwBh,t −
∑
j∈J
LFhj,t−k
∑
z∈Z
I lhz,t−k
(32)
The interbank rate rb is the minimum rate at which h is willing to lend
interbank funds, if not met it keeps them at the CB, where they are remunerated
at the set rate rL; rb is adjusted for the default probability of the counterparty,
ρb. For an hypothetical borrower z it is:
rbhz,t =
1 + rL
1− ρbhz,t
− 1 (33)
The default probability computed by h for z is a function of the observed finan-
cial leverage of z. Moreover, as in eq. (22), it takes into account the vulnerability
perceived by h via its own expected shortfall.
ρbhz,t = 1− e−s(lev
obs
z,t ESh,t) (34)
As discussed in sect. 2.1.2, riskier borrowers are more likely to be rationed
in case liquidity is scarce. It is also worth stressing that the model allows for
multiple lending, thus a bank can borrow from several lenders until its desired
borrowing is satisfied, but a bank cannot be a borrower and lender at the same
time.
2.7 Bankruptcies and new entrants
If the net worth turns negative firms or banks go bankrupt. Their losses are
absorbed by the balance sheets of their creditors, that could fail as well. Each
defaulted agent is then recapitalized and enters the system again. Households
are shareholders of firms and banks, so they participate to profits receiving
dividends. For the sake of simplicity, each firm or bank is assumed to be owned
by an equal number of households, which coincide with depositors for the bank.
16 Is and Id represent total loan supply and demand on the interbank market, which do
not equal actual borrowing or lending due to the failure of market clearing.
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2.7.1 Firms
When a firm defaults on loans, banks may not lose the entire amount of the
loan because they can seize the defaulting firm’s deposits. This results in a loss
equal to the net worth of the failed firm. The credit market permits for multiple
lenders, hence if a bankrupted firm has more than one creditor its default affects
all outstanding loans, with each creditor suffering a loss proportional to the size
of its loan with respect to the net worth of the borrower. After the default,
firms leave the market and are replaced in the next period by new start-ups,
which are initialized without liabilities and with positive deposits obtained from
a random share of shareholders’ wealth.
2.7.2 Banks
A bankrupt bank may also have multiple credit relationships, indeed the liabil-
ities side of banks’ balance sheet includes deposits from firms and households,
interbank funds and advances from the CB. In case of default each creditor suffer
a loss proportional to its credit with respect to the net worth of the bank. There
is just one creditor that is always guaranteed, namely the CB. This assumption
responds to the fact that in the real world advances or open market operations
are fully collateralized, but since the model does not include collateral, it is
assumed that the CB cannot make losses.
A bank in default does not leave the market, but it cannot operate in the
financial markets until it is recapitalized with a bail-in. For conciseness we
treat all banks in the same way, without considering the too-big-to-fail or too-
interconnected-to-fail issues. A bail-in consists in the conversion of liabilities
(L) in assets (A), in other words creditors turn a part of their deposits into
bank capital, such that:17
A ≥ 1
1− 0.03L
We assume that the minimum time needed to complete the bankruptcy pro-
cedure and recapitalization cannot be lower than trecap periods. In any case the
bail-in is successful only if creditors have enough capital to reach the required
asset/liabilities target, otherwise the bank remains in default until creditors can
afford such operation.
Finally is worth noting that the default of a bank may trigger the defaults
of its creditors, namely firms and banks. Households respond only with their
deposits, so that they end up without net worth in the worst case, while if a firm
loses a part of its deposits, it may not be able to repay loans and go bankrupt.
A similar reasoning applies for banks, whose balance sheet includes interbank
loans.
17The assets-liabilities ratio is set above the the minimum leverage rate defined by Basel III
since
capital(tierI)
A ≥ 3%, then A ≥
1
1−3%L.
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3 Results
The dynamics of the model are explored through numerical simulations. Base-
line parameters are listed in Appendix 6A. For each parametrisation of the
economy, Monte Carlo runs were set at 40. Subsection 3.1 discusses the macro-
dynamics of the model and investigates whether it can reproduce known empir-
ical regularities.
3.1 Baseline dynamics
The complex dynamics generated by the model do not admit closed form solu-
tions; rather they are analysed by means of numerical simulation. The following
set of figures demonstrate the baseline dynamics of the model. The displayed
time series in this subsection represent a single Monte Carlo run but they are rep-
resentative of the dynamics generated over the entire set of runs (see Sect. 3.3).
3.1.1 Business cycles
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Figure 3: Left: aggregate output and aggregate demand. Right: unemployment rate and price
index. The displayed series are 30-periods moving averages to improve legibility.
Unemployment rate and real wage
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Figure 4: Left: Unemployment rate and real wage. Right: profits in the firms sector and
labour demand. The displayed series are 30-periods moving averages to improve legibility.
The model exhibits endogenous business cycles. Firms compete to sell on
the goods market. They hire and pay wages to households, who in turn visit
sellers in order to buy goods at the most favourable price. As long as each firm
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is able to sell all its output, it revises upwards its production targets. Thus in
good times, unemployment is low and falling. This induces pressure on nominal
wages, as set by unions, resulting in rising costs of production. In comparing the
top right panel with the bottom left one, it can be observed that real wages rise
even when the price level is fairly constant (compare movements in real wages
with those in prices at times 1050, 1400 and 1750). Indeed rising nominal and
real wages induce cost-push inflation (via the mark-up over unit costs pricing
strategy of firms) which in turn leads to declining demand, falling profits and
increasing losses due to the combined effects of rising wage costs and unsold
output, and eventually rising unemployment and recession. Note that because
inflation is cost-push rather than demand-pull, we do not observe the negative
synchronicity between inflation and unemployment.18
An increase in unemployment reduces aggregate demand even further, pro-
longing the recession over several periods. Note that labour incomes account for
about 50% of the aggregate consumption budget of households. Moreover new
entrants into the business sector are limited in production by their size, while
the surviving firms cannot immediately absorb the unemployed workers, due
to the matching friction discussed in Sect. 2.3. During the recessionary phase,
firms losses build up as do defaults. From Fig. 5 it can be seen how close the
patterns of movement in unemployment and firm defaults are.
Defaults and losses
1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000
t
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
%
 d
ef
au
lts
-40
-20
0
20
40
lo
ss
es
def share of firms def share of banks losses of firms losses of banks
Unemployment  and losses
1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000
t
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
u
-40
-20
0
20
40
lo
ss
es
unemployment rate losses of firms losses of banks
Figure 5: Left: share of defaults and losses of firms and banks. Right: unemployment rate
and losses of firms and banks. The displayed series are 30-periods moving averages to improve
legibility.
Turning to banks, the dynamic pattern appears to coincide with those of
firms. A peak in firm defaults is associated with a peak in bank defaults.
Fig. 5 offers a description of what happens in both sectors. It is worth noting
that a self-reinforcing process exists: defaults in the business sector weaken the
balance sheets of banks, triggering defaults of the most fragile ones. In turn
these bankruptcies affect the banks’ creditors through deposits and interbank
loans, and may further weaken the net worth of the involved agents.
Recovery begins as the firm sector produces less and charges lower prices,
both because mark-ups have shrunk during the recession and nominal wages
18 A further indication that inflation is cost-push is that rising prices precede by a brief
interval of time declining demand (note the movements of the two series at approximately
time 1200, 1500 and 1830 respectively). If inflation was demand-pull declines in demand
would precede declining prices.
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have reduced due to lower inflation and high rates of unemployment. As prices
fall and unemployment decreases, aggregate demand picks up again. Under
these conditions firms can make positive profits. As profits increase, labour
demand moves upward (Fig. 4).
3.1.2 The financial side
We described above the dynamics of the real sector. We now consider the
dynamics of the financial sector and how these interact with those of firms.
The financial accelerator is evident in our model, with variations in interest
rates and the availability of funds on the credit market being the main transmis-
sion mechanisms. Fig. 6 shows how the average interest rate on credit markets
evolves along with unemployment over the course of a typical business cycle.
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Figure 6: Unemployment rate and interest rate to firms. The displayed series are 30-periods
moving averages to improve legibility.
The pattern is counter-cyclical (note that unemployment is perfectly counter-
cyclical in our model so a positive co-movement with unemployment means
a counter-cyclical variable). As the business cycle turns downwards, lenders
increase the interest rate charged to firms. This is both because of the increase
in counter-party risk and because they in turn face increasing fragility and higher
cost of funds.
To see the above mechanisms in greater detail, consider Fig. 7. The left
panel shows the co-movement between the interest rate charged to firms, the
interest rate on interbank loans and the expected shortfall of banks. Each of
these goes up when the macroeconomy heads towards recession. The right panel
shows that the maximum leverage banks allow themselves varies pro-cyclically,
increasing in good times (when expected shortfall ES goes down) and decreasing
in bad ones (when ES goes up).
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Figure 7: Left: interest rates and expected shortfall. Right: unemployment rate and maximum
allowed leverage of banks. The displayed series are 30-periods moving averages to improve
legibility.
In Fig. 8 we display the behaviour of credit supply to firms and credit
demand from firms in relation to the business cycle. The latter is counter-
cyclical with a lag while the former is pro-cyclical. The pro-cyclicality of credit
supply is based on their leverage strategy and almost mirrors the behaviour of
maximum leverage. The behaviour of credit demand follows from the financing
strategy of firms, which reflects the prediction of pecking-order theory that firms
use internal funds as a first recourse to meeting their operating costs and borrow
only to fill the gap. We have modelled this by calculating the liquidity need of
firms as equal to their planned wage bill minus their available net worth (minus
a precautionary liquidity buffer equal to 20% of net worth). During a downturn
the planned wage bill goes down but so does the net worth. In principle the
credit demand goes either way but the simulations resulted in lagged counter-
cyclicality.
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Figure 8: Left: credit demand by firms and unemployment. Right: credit supply to firms and
unemployment. The displayed series are 30-periods moving averages to improve legibility.
Comparing the two series, it can be seen that aggregate credit supply exceeds
aggregate credit demand throughout the business cycle. A couple of points need
further explanation at this stage. First, because of market segmentation, ag-
gregate supply exceeding aggregate demand does not mean that each individual
firm receives its entire demand as some firms can still be rationed within their
local network. We therefore plot actual credit exchanged (as a proportion of
output) in relation to the business cycle in Fig. 9. This verifies that the credit
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cycle is mainly demand-driven as it follows the same pattern as credit demand.
Credit/GDP and unemployment
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Figure 9: Credit to GDP ratio and unemployment. The displayed series are 30-periods moving
averages to improve legibility.
Second, the credit market is counter-cyclical and lags the business cycle.19
This is a result of the mechanism underlying credit demand, which in turn de-
termines overall lending by the short-side rule: firms’ borrow more as a recession
unfolds, even though the market, or average, interest rate goes up. This appar-
ent relationship between credit demand and interest rates arises not because of
any direct effect of the market interest rate; in fact individual borrowers can
only observe the interest rates offered to them by banks within their own net-
works and are unable to react to average rates. Rather it arises because credit
demand is calculated as a residual that bears a negative relationship to firms’
net worth which is a pro-cyclical variable.20
3.1.3 Interbank lending
The model also reproduces declines in interbank lending volumes and increased
interest rates during periods of financial turmoil.
Interbank interest rates (Eq. 33) depends upon the counter-party risk of
default, represented by banks’ financial leverage, and the vulnerability perceived
by each bank given its expected shortfall. In general rb follows a similar pattern
as ES, as already seen in Fig. 7, but its local dynamics is also determined by the
default probability of borrowers, computed as a function of financial leverage.
In accordance with stylised facts, during a downturn the interbank rate reaches
a peak, as displayed in Fig. 10. At the same time there is a reduction in
traded volumes, mainly led by the supply side. Recall that banks are subject
19 This contrasts with Jorda` et al. (2011), i.e. who report excess credit leading the ampli-
tude and the severity of the subsequent recession.
20 Of course firms are interest-rate sensitive in that they borrow from the cheapest available
lender. In a previous version of this paper, we have used a different approach where firms first
choose their financial structure via a leverage target and then base their labour demand on the
success at obtaining loans towards that target. That model displayed a different relationship
between credit demand and the market interest rate and thus replicated the stylised fact of
credit market booms leading the business cycle. However in acknowledgement of a referee’s
comment that firm behaviour is not conventionally driven by leverage targets we have changed
the manner in which firms base their output and financing decisions.
29
to regulatory constraints on their loanable funds, so they lend in proportion to
their net worth (see Eq. 21). As a result, there are disruptions in interbank
activity along with credit rationing, which in turn exacerbates reductions in
loan supply to firms and might give rise to rationing on the credit market.
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Figure 10: During a crisis the interbank rate increases, while the traded volume diminishes.
The displayed series are 30-periods moving averages to improve legibility.
However emergence of interbank rationing is more complex than the simple
supply-demand mismatch. Of course there is rationing when the supply is less
than demand, but there are other channels as well. In particular the incom-
plete nature of the interbank network might prevent potential borrowers from
connecting with lenders, which results in interbank rationing even if supply is
greater than demand at the aggregate level. Moreover banks choose the order
of borrowers on the basis of the counter-party’s perceived default probability, so
that the riskier ones are placed the last in queue even though they might be in
most immediate need of funds. The interaction of the mechanisms above leads
to rationing in the interbank market, which becomes more pronounced when
supply declines, as it is clear from Fig. 11. The area in red represents the sum
of the differences between total interbank demand and the realised borrowing of
the demanding banks at each t, which is a measure of interbank rationing. As
can be seen from the diagram, (i) interbank supply goes down while interbank
demand goes up during recessionary periods; (ii) rationing can occur even when
interbank supply exceeds interbank demand (see the right panel of Fig. 11) but
(ii) rationing increases as interbank supply decreases during recessions.
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Figure 11: Left: interbank supply versus interbank demand. Right: interbank supply net
of demand and rationing. The displayed series are 30-periods moving averages to improve
legibility.
3.2 The role of the interbank market.
The interbank market produces spill over effects on the real sector as a con-
sequence of rationing of interbank funds. The beginning of the process can be
attributed to an increase of expected shortfall due to losses on the credit market
as firms default due to adverse outcomes in the goods market. This effect is
related to the endogenous business cycle dynamics, as described in Sect. 3.1, in
other words the trigger of the process is the real sector.
The increase in expected shortfall leads to a decrease in the maximum lever-
age that banks can undertake and a rise in illiquid banks facing rationing on the
interbank market. Rationed banks must borrow from the central banks at high
rates, as a result the cost of funds soars. Along with this, those banks that can
access loans on the interbank market are charged higher rates (see Fig.s 12-13).
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Figure 12: Left : aggregate interbank demand and total exchanged volume. Right : advances
from the central banks. The displayed series are 30-periods moving averages to improve
legibility.
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Figure 13: Left : time evolution of interbank rate and interest rate to firms. Right : time
pattern of cost of funds. CB’s loans (yellow), interbank funds (red). The displayed series are
30-periods moving averages to improve legibility.
The increased cost of funds spills over to the interest rate charged on new
loans to firms, whose balance sheets are in turn weakened, thus generating
instability. Moreover the cost of borrowing from the CB reduces profits in the
banking sector and causes the default of banks in the lower part of the wealth
distribution. Such losses in turn contribute to weaken the balance sheets of
creditors, as the distress transfers to the business sector through a loss of the
deposits that they held in failing banks.
3.3 Robustness checks: the auto- and cross-correlation
structure
In this section we investigate the lagged correlation structure of the economy.
We start with the autocorrelation of output with its own lagged values and go
on to examine the cross-correlation of other key variables with lagged output.
Our aim is to verify that the time series plots presented in section 3.1 are
representative of the model’s dynamics, despite having been extracted from a
single simulation. The cyclical dynamics were tested through spectral analysis of
the simulated time series. We employed a Discrete Fourier Transform to switch
from the time to the frequency domain of the signals. Results were averaged on
a sample of 40 independent Monte Carlo repetitions of 2000 periods each.
Fig. 14 shows the amplitude spectrum of output: the x-axis represents the
frequency domain (in periods), while the y-axis reports the amplitude of the
signal (in terms of output) at each frequency. The dominant frequencies are
those at which the signal shows the greatest amplitude and they correspond to
the peaks of the business cycle. The cycles occur on average once every 400
periods. The spectral analysis of the main aggregate variables is reported in
the last two columns of Tab. 1, which shows that they too are cyclical with
a periodicity that is also approximately 400. These results suggest that the
model generates a recurring cyclical pattern, irrespective of the initial seed of
the pseudo-random number generator.21
21A few individual variables, namely the net worth of firms and the interbank interest rate,
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Figure 14: Amplitude spectrum of output. The average and standard deviation are computed
on a sample of 40 Monte Carlo trials.
Examining Tab. 1 we see that consumption (C) has a maximum correlation
of 0.96 with output at t: this suggests that consumption rises and falls in almost
perfect synchronicity with output. Both prices (P ) and wages (W ), on the
other hand, have a maximum negative correlation of 0.73 with output at t-25
suggesting that they are counter-cyclical and lead output by 25 periods. In
other words the trough in output is reached 25 periods after prices and wages
peak. This is in line with the time series behaviour of prices shown in Fig. 3 and
the cost-push explanation offered for it in Sect. 3.1. Similarly credit demand Ld
and the stock of loans to firms L are counter-cyclical with absolute correlations
with output, peaking at 0.44 and 0.73 respectively, somewhere between t + 25
to t+ 50. This suggests that peaks in these variables arise 25-50 periods after a
trough in output. This is in line with the explanation offered in sec. 3.1. Note
that the net worth of firms is pro-cyclical with a lag of approximately 25 periods
and that credit demanded by firms tends to rise as their net worth falls, as was
noted in explaining the behaviour of credit demand in Fig. 8. On the interbank
market Id, Is and I l follow the liquidity target, which is largely determined
by past losses. When output is low, banks experience high losses: deficit banks
increase their liquidity demand while surplus banks reduce their liquidity supply,
implying that rationing might occur during a crisis. One interesting result is that
while firms’ net worth lags output in a pro-cyclical fashion, banks’ net worth is
also pro-cyclical but appears to lead output by 25 periods. Thus downturns in
banks’ net worth can be predictors of a downturn in economic activity. Finally
interest rates on loans to firms (rf ) and banks (rb) as well as banks’ expected
shortfall (ES) are counter-cyclical and synchronous with output.
display standard deviations in excess of 100, suggesting that their periodicity is less smooth
than is the case of other variables.
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Table 1: Cross correlation between the main aggregate variables and lagged values of output.
The last two columns refer to the average period of the time-series (from spectral analysis)
and to the standard deviation (std) across 40 Monte Carlo trials.
−200 −150 −100 −50 −25 t +25 +50 +100 +150 +200 period std
Y s -0.44 -0.49 -0.16 0.33 0.61 1.00 0.61 0.33 -0.16 -0.49 -0.44 391.67 36.79
Y d -0.52 -0.41 0.01 0.52 0.75 0.92 0.53 0.16 -0.37 -0.60 -0.37 397.50 38.03
C -0.49 -0.45 -0.06 0.46 0.70 0.96 0.56 0.23 -0.29 -0.56 -0.40 391.67 36.79
P 0.45 0.17 -0.25 -0.65 -0.73 -0.64 -0.27 0.15 0.58 0.56 0.17 394.17 40.57
W 0.45 0.16 -0.26 -0.66 -0.73 -0.63 -0.26 0.16 0.59 0.55 0.17 394.17 40.57
U 0.44 0.49 0.16 -0.33 -0.61 -1.00 -0.61 -0.33 0.16 0.49 0.44 391.67 36.79
Ld 0.13 0.37 0.32 -0.01 -0.24 -0.44 -0.44 -0.41 -0.23 0.13 0.34 394.17 40.57
Ls -0.59 -0.31 0.21 0.64 0.73 0.67 0.37 0.03 -0.54 -0.71 -0.32 401.67 54.93
L 0.21 0.64 0.62 0.05 -0.29 -0.58 -0.73 -0.73 -0.36 0.23 0.58 394.17 40.57
Id 0.44 0.53 0.26 -0.26 -0.58 -0.64 -0.56 -0.39 -0.01 0.42 0.46 391.31 44.03
Is -0.55 -0.28 0.16 0.60 0.71 0.66 0.39 0.02 -0.54 -0.66 -0.26 401.67 54.93
I -0.41 -0.19 0.04 0.10 0.31 0.34 0.22 0.07 -0.15 -0.27 -0.08 387.14 41.28
nwH -0.55 -0.37 -0.02 0.39 0.64 0.62 0.43 0.23 -0.25 -0.54 -0.29 400.00 41.34
nwF -0.32 -0.67 -0.55 0.05 0.43 0.72 0.78 0.69 0.23 -0.33 -0.59 409.17 104.05
nwB -0.58 -0.14 0.38 0.66 0.68 0.52 0.17 -0.19 -0.65 -0.66 -0.16 401.67 54.93
rf 0.36 0.34 0.10 -0.20 -0.38 -0.59 -0.47 -0.23 0.22 0.41 0.31 380.64 77.63
rb 0.36 0.67 0.40 -0.14 -0.46 -0.65 -0.65 -0.56 -0.18 0.36 0.57 414.64 140.92
ES 0.39 0.50 0.23 -0.27 -0.53 -0.70 -0.60 -0.37 0.14 0.52 0.47 394.17 40.57
Legend: Y s output, Y d aggregate demand, C consumption, P price level, W wage rate, U unemployment rate, Ld
loan demand, Ls loan supply, L loans to firms, Id interbank demand, Is interbank supply, I interbank loans,
nwF net worth of firms, nwB net worth of banks, rf interest rate to firms, rb interest rate to banks, ES
expected shortfall.
4 Interbank connectivity
In this section we present the results of increasing connectivity within the in-
terbank market on both the financial markets and the real economy. By con-
nectivity we mean the number of potential banks with which a given bank can
exchange credit on the interbank market. We simulated the model with different
levels of interbank connectivity and check for network effects on the system.22
As discussed in Appendix 6.D, the interbank network is obtained by growing
a preferential-attachment model with m initial nodes, adding one node with n
edges at each iteration. The initial number of nodes represents the core of
the network, where every node is connected with the other. As new nodes
are added, they tend to form the peripheral part of the structure. In order
to check the effects of increased interconnectivity, we generate nine networks
by increasing the number of edges for new nodes. The values of m and n are
chosen to monotonically increase the density of the network between 0.08 (least
connected graph) and 0.34 (most connected graph). Values are reported in the
bottom part of Tab. 2.23 Furthermore we add the connectivity level d0, which
corresponds to the absence of an interbank market, so that the adjacency matrix
of the interbank network is null. Note that in going from d0 to d1, the number
of nodes jumps from 0 to 9; thereafter, it increases by adding one node at a
time, thus the results comparing outcomes in d0 with outcomes in d1 should be
interpreted in this context.
Another point to note is that in running Monte Carlo simulations at each
22We conducted 40 Monte Carlo replications for each level of connectivity. Each simulation
lasts for 3000 periods (where the first 1000 periods are discarded to eliminate the transient).
23The resulting structures define a set of fixed network topologies that constrain the maxi-
mum degree of each node. Realised degrees of nodes observed throughout the simulations can
be at most equal to such determined potential degrees.
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level of connectivity, d1 to d9, the network was held fixed at each level of
connectivity (in order to minimise noise across simulations at a given level of
connectivity). Because the network is randomly generated at each level, fixing
it across simulations makes it more likely that not all network properties will
change monotonically with increasing connectivity (see, e.g the behaviour of
max degree in Tab. 2) so the interpretation of results should also bear this
mind.24
Network statistics Connectivity
d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 d8 d9
Density 0.08 0.11 0.14 0.17 0.21 0.24 0.27 0.30 0.34
Avg degree 4.12 5.20 7.00 8.32 10.16 11.68 13.16 14.76 16.52
Median degree 2.00 2.50 3.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 8.00 9.00 10.00
Max degree 25.00 24.00 33.00 37.00 43.00 43.00 48.00 43.00 48.00
Avg path length 2.37 2.17 1.91 1.84 1.76 1.73 1.70 1.66 1.63
Initial nodes (m) 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
New edges (n) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Table 2: Network statistics for the interbank network
4.1 Macroeconomic outcomes and connectivity
We start by examining the effects of increasing connectivity on the macroecon-
omy. The top panels of Fig. 15 shows the effect of connectivity on (i) output;
(ii) duration of unemployment spells and (iii) frequency of cycles in unemploy-
ment across the different simulations at each level of connectivity. The dots are
averages and bars represent standard errors.
The behaviour of output (which can be interpreted as a measure of eco-
nomic efficiency) is surprisingly non-monotonic. At first this is puzzling, given
the prior expectation that increasing interbank connectivity should make funds
more readily available from surplus banks to firms (recall that direct bank:firm
links are never 100%) and thus improve economic efficiency. However as we see
from the bottom right plot the number of firm defaults also tends to change
non-monotonically with connectivity. It seems that adding an interbank market
makes firms default increase, then moderate increases from d1 to d3 help re-
duce firm defaults slightly (although the errors are fairly large), but increasing
connectivity further makes defaults tend to rise again.
Going deeper, the top right plot shows that introducing the interbank market
almost doubles the frequency of business cycles, while it can be seen from the top
centre plot that their duration reduces by a similar factor.25 Further increasing
24 In any case, a monotonic evolution of network properties can never be guaranteed in this
type of random network.
25 The length of unemployment is computed as the average value per Monte Carlo of at
least 10 consecutive periods where the unemployment rate is greater than 0.05. Frequency of
cycles in unemployment is the average per Monte Carlo of the dominant frequencies obtained
through spectral analysis of moving average series of unemployment rate. We employ the Fast
Fourier Transform algorithm to compute the Discrete Fourier Transform which converts the
time series from the time domain to the frequency domain. Next the frequency associated
with the highest power spectrum is identified as the dominant frequency.
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Figure 15: The effects of increasing connectivity on average output, cycles and firm defaults
connectivity from d1 to d3 slightly reduces the duration of recessions while
going from d3 to d9 tends to increase them. The average frequency appears to
move in the opposite direction, although given that there is much more noise
in that plot it seems that increasing connectivity from d1 upwards does not
have a significant effect on frequency.26 The overall picture appears to be that
adding an interbank market makes the economy more volatile compared to no
interbank market, as firms are able to borrow greater amounts. While the latter
enhances production the former leads to more business cycles.
As we can see from the middle right panel of Fig. 19, which is introduced
a bit further on, increasing interbank connectivity from d1 onwards does not
have a significant effect on the overall volume of credit flowing from banks
to firms; thus the efficiency-enhancing effect remains relatively stagnant. On
the other hand, the changing nature of the economic business cycle affects the
rate of firm defaults in a non-monotonic way. From the bottom centre plot
we can see that firm defaults caused by failing banks go down monotonically
with connectivity; however, defaults arising from losses on the goods market
jump up as connectivity increases from d0 to d1, due to the upward jump in
frequency of cycles, but then increasing further from d1 to d3, makes the cycles
slightly shorter without changing their frequency very much; hence defaults fall
over this range. Increasing connectivity further enhances the duration of cycles,
again without significant impact on frequency so defaults go up again.
Putting the above observations together, we see that (i) adding an interbank
26 Comparing time series across connectivity levels it was also hard to tell them apart in
terms of frequency of cycles.
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market makes the flow of credit increase considerably along with volatility in
the goods market as firms become more leveraged and thus more likely to fail;
(ii) increasing connectivity further does not increase the flow of funds much
more but initially reduces firm failures, most likely because the effect of easier
credit availability helps failing firms to avoid default more than it increases
the vulnerability of other firms, and (iii) eventually increases firm failures as
more and more firms feel themselves over-leveraged relative to their ability to
repay. In this respect, increases in interbank connectivity produce an outcome
resembling what the growth of what some authors have called zombie firms that
add little to overall productivity in the economy but are prone to failure due to
their inability to repay the debt that they so easily incur (see Acharya et al.,
2017; McGowan et al., 2017). The reason output behaves non-monotonically
is that each time a firm fails, the firm that replaces it takes time to build up
its own capacity and hire workers. In fact, the positive correlation that we see
between the behaviour of firm defaults and the length of unemployment spells is
because the more firms that fail the longer it takes the labour market to return
to full employment.
Fig. 16 shows how competition in the real sector changes with connectivity.
It displays the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HF ) which measures concentra-
tion.27 The value of HF varies between approximately 0.00482 and 0.00494
over different connectivities. It rises from 0.00483 to its maximum value as the
interbank market is opened, but then it decreases steadily, down to approxi-
mately 0.00482, as further connectivity is added. The explanation appears to
be that with no interbank market, all firms are equally (un)able to access funds
while once a market is opened, inequalities emerge as some firms are better
able to access funds via the interbank channel than others. But with further
increases in connectivity and more rapid failures of incumbent firms, market
shares tend towards relative equality again both because access spreads more
widely across incumbent firms and because there are more new, small firms.
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Figure 16: The Herfindahl-Hirschman index and connectivity.
27 HF is computed as the sum of the square of each firms’ market share. With 250 firms,
if each firm were to have the same share, the HF would be 0.004. If on the other hand there
was a single monopolist it would be 1.
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4.2 The banking sector and connectivity
We have seen from the above that while an interbank market enhances efficiency
it also has the potential to destabilise. In particular we saw that business cy-
cles can increase in frequency and duration as a result of increasing the inter-
bank market and/or increasing connectivity within an existing market. In this
subsection we shall explore further the mechanisms through which interbank
connectivity affects financial fragility via its effects on bank balance sheets.
Part (a) of Fig. 17 shows bank losses per unit of equity, which is a more
precise measure of fragility than absolute losses. It shows how aggregate losses
per equity change with connectivity (bottom right panel), along with the three
main sources of such losses: negative profits from having to borrow from the
Central Bank (top left), losses arising due to debtor firm defaults (top right), and
those from interbank borrower defaults (bottom left). Part (b) shows similar
plots for bank defaults. The behaviour of each measure of bank fragility is
similar as connectivity increases.
It can be seen that while increasing connectivity makes banks safer on the
whole, this is mainly because banks have to resort less frequently to Central
Bank advances to meet their own liquidity needs. Thus losses and defaults
arising from Central Bank advances decline monotonically while losses arising
from interbank defaults rise in the same fashion. Neither is surprising since
banks now switch from Central Bank advances to interbank borrowing. Losses
arising from borrower firms defaulting tend to behave in an irregular fashion,
with apparent turning points at d1 and d3, and there is much more noise in
this dimension. This is possibly because the greater access of firms to funds via
the interbank market makes them more likely to default. Note that the turning
points in the upper right plot of Fig. 17(a) reflect the behaviour of firm defaults
in the right panel of Fig. 15(b).
Fig. 18 examines behaviour of extreme losses and defaults. To be precise
we look at how the 99th percentile of losses per equity and numbers of banks
defaulting at the same time (i.e. in a single period) changes as connectivity
increases. The purpose is to see whether extreme events behave differently from
the average.
As the plot shows, while the right tail tends to show the same qualitative
variation as the mean of the distribution, a few differences can be observed.
Large losses arising from firm defaults tend to become even more irregular and
volatile, thus defaults arising from such losses tend no longer to decline mono-
tonically with connectivity. Similarly the possibility of a large number of banks
defaulting simultaneously goes up with connectivity. This adds to the insight
that increasing connectivity can increase financial fragility; in this case, at the
right tail of the distribution.
We next see how interbank connectivity affects average performance in both
the banking and the real sectors. Bank profits tend to increase with connectiv-
ity, this is not surprising since banks are able to increase their intermediation
activity as the interbank network expands . Firm profits decrease sharply when
the interbank market is introduced but then do not change significantly as con-
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Figure 17: The behaviour of bank losses and defaults and their sources.
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Figure 18: The sources and behaviour of extreme values of bank losses and defaults per period.
nectivity increases. Recall the conflicting effects of enabling firms greater access
to banking sector funding as the interbank network opens: firms become more
likely to be able access liquidity in order to meet production targets but there
are also more failures. Beyond this, it appears the conflicting forces that shaped
firm defaults in Fig. 15 tend to keep average profits stable since, while surviving
firms are able to access more credit in order to meet their production targets,
more firms fail especially after d3 so averages tend to stay relatively constant.
Fig. 19(b) shows how lending volumes evolve with connectivity. As expected
interbank lending volumes go up as banks are better able to avoid using expen-
sive Central Bank advances. Credit to firms increases sharply but then tends to
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Figure 19: The effect of connectivity on bank and firm profits, credit flows and interest rates.
stay roughly the same. But note that since defaults start increasing especially
after d3, this means that fewer firms benefit from these funds at least until their
replacements come up to speed.
Finally part (c) looks at how interest rates evolve. Interbank rates tend to
increase monotonically (after d1, since at d0 the interbank rate is not defined)
which reflects the increasing likelihood of default on the interbank market. How-
ever, the rate of increase appears to be diminishing as connectivity increases,
which indicates that the increasing probability of default is being offset by a
countervailing force, namely increasing competition among lenders. Eventually
after crossing d5 they tend to go down (with some noise at d8).
The interest rates charged to firms decrease sharply in going from d0 to
d1 but then they follow an irregular and somewhat noisy (across simulations)
pattern. The explanation seems related to the behaviour of firm defaults on the
one hand (which behave non-monotonically between d1 and d9, first decreasing
and then increasing) and the cost of funds within the banking system (which
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go up from from d1 to d5 and then tend to decrease), the combination of these
effects drives the pattern on the right panel of Fig. 19(c).
We last consider Fig. 20. This looks at various measures that determine the
overall supply of funds in the interbank market. The first panel looks at liquidity
hoarding which increases monotonically with connectivity,28 despite interbank
rationing decreases. This pattern is explained by the behaviour of the variables
in the bottom part of the subfigure (a), that is Expected Shortfall (ES) and the
leverage constraint of banks (λmax), that determine interbank supply. Banks
adopt an internal risk mechanism based on historical losses. Perceived risk in
turn is measured by ES, as the average of losses over the loan portfolio exceeding
the historical VaR during the last n periods at 97.5% confidence level. The more
extreme events affect banks’ portfolio, the higher is their expected shortfall. In-
creasing connectivity enhances the volumes of credit to firms and banks (see Fig.
19), but also the likelihood of large losses. In other words what matters are not
losses themselves, but their volatility. Moving to a state with higher volatility
makes bank more careful. This is reflected in their expected shortfalls that in
turn determine the liquidity target, interbank supply and the hoarded liquidity.
The greater volatility of losses could be explained by the larger exposure of the
banking sector to firms and banks along with connectivity. When connectivity
grows more banks offer competitive interest rates to borrowers, while if connec-
tivity is low banks charge lenders with the cost of CB’s funds. The better access
to credit allows borrowers to satisfy their demand from fewer banks, that is mul-
tiple loans reduce with connectivity (Fig. 20 (b) bottom-left). As a result the
credit market is characterized by an higher concentration of borrowers per bank
and lower diversification. Furthermore the number of active interbank linkages
goes up with connectivity, thus easing interbank contagion (see Fig. 17). In the
end growing connectivity leads to increasing levels of liquidity hoarding.
28 Liquidity hoarding is measured as the sum over the difference between all borrower-lender
pairs in the interbank market of the liquidity demanded by the borrower and the loan offered
by the lender conditional on the lender holding sufficient reserves to satisy the demand. In
mathematical terms it can be written as∑
i∈IB
∑
h∈IL
(Idih,t − Ishi,t) if Ishi,t < Idih,t ≤ Rh,t
where i represents a borrower, h a lender, IB is the set of borrowing banks, IL is the set of
lending banks, Idih is the loan demand from i to h, I
s
hi is the loan offered by h to i and Rh is
the available liquidity of lender h. Liquidity hoarding arises not just because liquidity-surplus
banks face leverage constraints but because they hold liquidity buffers in order to satisfy their
own estimated liquidity needs.
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Figure 20: (a) Liquidity hoarding and interbank rationing to interbank demand ratios, leverage
constraints and expected shortfall of the banking system.
(b) Total out-degrees of banks in credit and interbank networks, share of firms with multiple
loans and standard deviation of banks’ total losses.
5 Concluding remarks
We developed an agent-based model that incorporated both real and financial
sectors, including an interbank market which complemented the credit market
in facilitating the provision of liquidity by banks to the real economy. The set
of potential interactions among lenders and borrowers was governed by static
network structures in each market. A distinctive feature of the model consisted
in the way in which the effects of prudential regulation were accounted for: in
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particular minimum capital requirements and the maximum allowed financial
leverage depended upon the expected shortfall computed by each bank on the
basis of the losses experienced in the recent past. Moreover we generated hetero-
geneity in banks’ loan maturities by assuming a lagged structure of maturities
of loans to the firm sector.
The model’s dynamics were explored through simulations. We first showed
that endogenous business cycles can occur, driven by price and wage dynamics
that result from the behaviour of firms and unions rather than through any
external disturbance. In the boom phase, unemployment is low, demand is
high, firms increase output, while prices rise both because unions set higher
wages and because firms increase mark-ups. The latter sows the seeds for a
future downturn as at some point there is over-production of output and firms
begin to experience losses.
Second, we showed that the effects of firm closures in the real sector are
amplified by the financial side of the economy via a financial accelerator. In
particular, a recession creates spill-over effects in financial markets, such as the
reduction of credit availability and higher interest rates. Our analysis shows that
these are mainly driven by prudential regulations that lead banks to deleverage
as well as to increase their own precautionary liquidity buffers, resulting in both
cases in liquidity hoarding.
Third, the financial amplification mechanism is strictly related to the pro-
cyclical effects of prudential regulation. In order to comply with capital regu-
lations, banks must hold enough capital to cover potential losses as estimated
by applying the expected shortfall measure, which in turn is based on its VaR
estimates over a fixed number of past periods. The key here is the possibility
of risk misperception at different stages of the business cycle. In good times,
observed losses are low so the VaR and expected shortfall measures are low ex
ante. Capital constraints are therefore generous. As a slump begins, VaR and
expected shortfall measures rise ex post and the constraints tighten, contribut-
ing to the credit crunch which aggravates the slump. While the model is not
primarily aimed at policy analysis, these results support the Basel III aim of
designing prudential regulation that focuses on limiting credit expansion during
booms, in order to reduce the extent and severity of the downturn.
We also found that that increasing connectivity has ambiguous effects on
both the efficiency and stability of the real sector. Efficiency, as measured by
output levels, increases as a result of greater connectivity but then it decreases.
The reason appears to be that business cycles and firm failures can also be
increased by greater connectivity, especially after a threshold of connectivity is
crossed. As a result of more firm failures there is greater disruption and longer
spells of unemployment following a recession. Greater connectivity however
seems to increase bank profits while having ambiguous effect of those on the
firm sector.
In future research, we plan to improve the performance of the model by
introducing dynamic elements into the real economy, via capital accumulation
or, as an alternative, endogenous growth in labour productivity (via learning
by doing) as in Delli Gatti et al. (2011). In addition trades on the interbank
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market could include other kinds of assets with different maturities. We would
also wish to model firm strategies in a way that allows firms choice of capital
structure to be both endogenous and to play a greater role in the business
cycle. Finally the behaviour of the Central Bank could be endogenised so that
it actively manages the interest rate corridor to ensure macroeconomic stability
by means of monetary policy.
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6 Appendix
Appendix 6.A Calibration and initial values
The parameters of the model are reported in Tab. 3. It is worth noticing that the value
of transfers is obtained from the steady state solution of a backbone model. It ensures the
steady state level of full employment when the wage rate W and the mark-up rate µ are at
their initial values:
G =
W 0Nfull
[
1 + µ− (1− θ)
(
c1 + c2
1−c1
c2−rD
)]
(
c1 + c2
1−c1
c2−rD
)
Table 3: Calibration of the baseline model
Parameter Description Value
T Length of the simulation 2000
NF Number of firms 250
NH Number of households 750
NB Number of banks 50
α Labour productivity 2
W 0 Initial wage rate 2
θ Tax rate 0.4
δ Dividend share 0.5
c1 Marginal propensity to consume out of income 0.8
c2 Marginal propensity to consume out of savings 0.2
rL Interest rate on reserves 0
rD Interest rate on deposits 0
rB Interest rate on bills 0
rH Interest rate on advances 0.05
rr Reserve coefficient 0.03
vf Sensitivity of r
f to the default probability 0.12
vb Sensitivity of r
b to the default probability 0.69
λ Maximum leverage rate banks 24
τ Length of firms’ and banks’ memory 10
τw Length of unions’ memory 120
τES Length of losses memory (ES) 100
σ1 Sensitivity of the wage rate to unemployment 0.05
σ2 Sensitivity of the wage rate to hysteresis 0.15
u∗ Full-employment rate of unemployment 0.03
Fh Share of firms observed on the goods market 0.2
µ Initial mark-up rate 0.01
rev Equity/assets ratio of the recapitalized banks 0.03
Lmax maximum duration of loans 10
Lmin minimum duration of loans 2
trecap minimum time between bankrupt and recapitalization of banks 5
G transfers 465
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Appendix 6.B Accounting
The equations of the model are divided in the behavioural and accounting ones.
The model includes both stock and flow variables. A stock-flow consistent
accounting system can verify consistency among them. It is composed by a
transactions flow matrix (Tab. 4) and a balance sheet matrix (Tab. 5). The
former describes the changes in the stock variables between the beginning and
the end of any time period while the latter indicates the level of the stock
variables at a given time, resulting in the description of the model from an
accountancy viewpoint.
6.B.1 Aggregate balance sheet and transactions matrix
Tab. 4 represent the aggregate balance sheet of the economic system. The sum
of each row and column is zero and each element for a class of agents balances
with the corresponding one. Since it is assumed that (i) there is no physical
capital and (ii) inventories are perishable, the firms’ accounts sum to zero and
the sum of all the net worth is zero, so that the government has a negative net
worth.29 ∑
i∈NH
nwHi +
∑
j∈NF
nwFj +
∑
h∈NB
nwBh + nw
G = 0
Tab. 5 represents the aggregate transactions taking place in the system.
Each flow should move from a class of agents to another (the intra-class flows
are not displayed at the aggregate level) as it is reported on the rows. The
aggregate flows occurring within a class of agents is represented on the columns
and may be divided in current (CA) and capital accounts (KA). The current
account describes the current inflows and outflows due to payments or earnings,
while the capital account describes the changes in the balance sheet of the
agents, that is the change in assets or liabilities.
29In a model with physical capital and/or inventories the sum of the latter plus the sum of
the net worth should be zero.
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Table 4: Aggregate balance sheet
HH FF BB CB Gov
∑
Deposits +DH +DF −DB 0
Loans −LF +LF 0
Bills +B −B 0
Reserves +R −R 0
Advances −A +A 0
Net worth −nwH −nwF −nwB −nwG 0∑
0 0 0 0 0 0
Variables measured at current prices. Assets(+), liabilities(-). Households (HH), firms (FF), banks
(BB), central bank (CB), government (Gov).
Table 5: Aggregate transactions flow matrix
HH FF BB CB Gov
∑
CA KA CA KA CA KA
Consumption −C +C 0
Transfers +G −G 0
Production Y 0
Wages +WN −WN 0
Taxes −TH −TF −TB +T 0
Profits Firms +δΠF −ΠF +(1 −
δ)ΠF
0
Profits Banks +δΠB −ΠB +(1 −
δ)ΠB
0
Profits CB −ΠCB +ΠCB 0
Deposits interest +rDDH +rDDF −rDD 0
Loans interest −rfLf +rfLf 0
Bills interests +rBB −rBB 0
Reserves interests +rRR −rRR 0
Advances interests −rHA +rHA 0
∆Loans +∆L −∆L 0
∆Bills −∆B +∆B 0
∆Reserves −∆R +∆R 0
∆Deposits −∆DH −∆DF +∆D 0
∆ Advances +∆A −∆A 0∑
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Variables measured at current prices. Sources of funds(+), uses of funds(-). Households (HH), firms
(FF), banks (BB), central bank (CB), government (Gov).
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Appendix 6.C Correlation structure
Tab. 6 reports the average correlation coefficients across 40 Monte Carlo simu-
lations of 2000 periods and different initial seeds of the pseudo-random number
generator. Averages are computed setting to zero those coefficients with a p-
value greater than 0.05
52
Table 6: Average cross-correlations between the main aggregate variables. Standard deviations in parenthesis.
Y s Y d Y C P W U Ld Ls L Id Is I A nwH nwF nwB B ΠF ΠB rf rb ES
Y s 1.00 0.91 0.96 0.96 -0.64 -0.64 -1.00 -0.38 0.67 -0.57 -0.58 0.50 0.27 -0.55 0.59 0.71 0.53 0.86 0.48 -0.46 -0.55 -0.62 -0.75
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Y d 0.91 1.00 0.98 0.98 -0.89 -0.88 -0.91 -0.21 0.84 -0.38 -0.47 0.69 0.29 -0.48 0.78 0.54 0.77 0.82 0.66 -0.27 -0.59 -0.46 -0.76
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
C 0.96 0.98 1.00 1.00 -0.80 -0.79 -0.96 -0.29 0.79 -0.47 -0.54 0.62 0.29 -0.53 0.68 0.62 0.68 0.85 0.65 -0.36 -0.57 -0.54 -0.76
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
P -0.64 -0.89 -0.80 -0.80 1.00 0.99 0.64 -0.00 -0.84 0.06 0.22 -0.76 -0.21 0.25 -0.75 -0.22 -0.86 -0.58 -0.70 -0.00 0.49 0.16 0.60
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
W -0.64 -0.88 -0.79 -0.79 0.99 1.00 0.64 -0.00 -0.85 0.00 0.22 -0.77 -0.22 0.26 -0.75 -0.21 -0.87 -0.58 -0.71 -0.00 0.48 0.16 0.60
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
U -1.00 -0.91 -0.96 -0.96 0.64 0.64 1.00 0.38 -0.67 0.57 0.58 -0.50 -0.27 0.55 -0.59 -0.71 -0.53 -0.86 -0.48 0.46 0.55 0.62 0.75
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Ld -0.38 -0.21 -0.29 -0.29 -0.00 -0.00 0.38 1.00 -0.00 0.61 0.53 0.00 0.06 0.38 -0.00 -0.58 0.12 -0.45 -0.18 0.56 0.23 0.58 0.29
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Ls 0.67 0.84 0.79 0.79 -0.84 -0.85 -0.67 -0.00 1.00 -0.10 -0.38 0.87 0.34 -0.42 0.75 0.28 0.93 0.66 0.73 -0.15 -0.52 -0.40 -0.74
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
L -0.57 -0.38 -0.47 -0.47 0.06 0.00 0.57 0.61 -0.10 1.00 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.50 -0.12 -0.96 0.14 -0.78 -0.32 0.78 0.35 0.73 0.50
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Id -0.58 -0.47 -0.54 -0.54 0.22 0.22 0.58 0.53 -0.38 0.67 1.00 -0.14 -0.39 0.93 -0.32 -0.72 -0.23 -0.73 -0.50 0.39 0.35 0.79 0.47
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Is 0.50 0.69 0.62 0.62 -0.76 -0.77 -0.50 0.00 0.87 0.00 -0.14 1.00 0.27 -0.21 0.63 0.12 0.81 0.47 0.59 -0.00 -0.44 -0.19 -0.70
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
I 0.27 0.29 0.29 0.29 -0.21 -0.22 -0.27 0.06 0.34 0.00 -0.39 0.27 1.00 -0.70 0.36 0.07 0.42 0.25 0.24 0.29 -0.08 -0.18 -0.14
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
A -0.55 -0.48 -0.53 -0.53 0.25 0.26 0.55 0.38 -0.42 0.50 0.93 -0.21 -0.70 1.00 -0.39 -0.58 -0.34 -0.66 -0.48 0.18 0.30 0.68 0.41
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
nwH 0.59 0.78 0.68 0.68 -0.75 -0.75 -0.59 -0.00 0.75 -0.12 -0.32 0.63 0.36 -0.39 1.00 0.26 0.76 0.59 0.53 0.00 -0.48 -0.18 -0.57
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
nwF 0.71 0.54 0.62 0.62 -0.22 -0.21 -0.71 -0.58 0.28 -0.96 -0.72 0.12 0.07 -0.58 0.26 1.00 0.00 0.89 0.44 -0.77 -0.47 -0.79 -0.64
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
nwB 0.53 0.77 0.68 0.68 -0.86 -0.87 -0.53 0.12 0.93 0.14 -0.23 0.81 0.42 -0.34 0.76 0.00 1.00 0.48 0.65 0.15 -0.40 -0.14 -0.50
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
B 0.86 0.82 0.85 0.85 -0.58 -0.58 -0.86 -0.45 0.66 -0.78 -0.73 0.47 0.25 -0.66 0.59 0.89 0.48 1.00 0.67 -0.60 -0.60 -0.75 -0.79
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ΠF 0.48 0.66 0.65 0.65 -0.70 -0.71 -0.48 -0.18 0.73 -0.32 -0.50 0.59 0.24 -0.48 0.53 0.44 0.65 0.67 1.00 -0.29 -0.45 -0.51 -0.59
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ΠB -0.46 -0.27 -0.36 -0.36 -0.00 -0.00 0.46 0.56 -0.15 0.78 0.39 -0.00 0.29 0.18 0.00 -0.77 0.15 -0.60 -0.29 1.00 0.34 0.80 0.50
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
rf -0.55 -0.59 -0.57 -0.57 0.49 0.48 0.55 0.23 -0.52 0.35 0.35 -0.44 -0.08 0.30 -0.48 -0.47 -0.40 -0.60 -0.45 0.34 1.00 0.41 0.63
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
rb -0.62 -0.46 -0.54 -0.54 0.16 0.16 0.62 0.58 -0.40 0.73 0.79 -0.19 -0.18 0.68 -0.18 -0.79 -0.14 -0.75 -0.51 0.80 0.41 1.00 0.57
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ES -0.75 -0.76 -0.76 -0.76 0.60 0.60 0.75 0.29 -0.74 0.50 0.47 -0.70 -0.14 0.41 -0.57 -0.64 -0.50 -0.79 -0.59 0.50 0.63 0.57 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
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Appendix 6.D Networks generation and statistics
In this part of the appendix we describe in detail the generation of the networks
and their characteristics.
1. We create deposits networks (households and firms) following the steps
below: the household-bank deposit network is built through a preferential
attachment algorithm with a randomly generated fitness measure. Each
household i enters the matching process and has a pi,b probability to link
with a randomly chosen bank b, where the total degree of the bank is
degreeb and its fitness measure is fitnessb:
pi,b =
degreebfitb∑
degreebfitnessb
If a new link is formed, the household exits the algorithm and the degree
of b is updated, otherwise it repeats the matching process until it connects
to a node. At the end each household has a link, so that the total degree
of the network is equal to the number of households.
The creation of the firm-bank deposit networks is similar, but the at-
tachment probability is only determined by the degree of banks in the
household-bank network, so that banks have a similar out-degree in both
networks.
2. The credit network is generated through the same preferential attachment
mechanism above, where the fitness measure is inversely proportional to
the normalized degree of banks in the deposit networks. In this case when
a new link is created, the firm does not exit from the matching process
but meets the next bank in the list. The algorithm is repeated 5 times.
3. The interbank network is generated through a Bianconi-Barabasi model
(Bianconi and Baraba´si, 2001), where the fitness measure is the degree of
banks in the firm-bank credit network.
This approach results in the creation of a network structure in which those
banks with many links with depositors are potential lenders on the interbank
market. They also have a low interbank degree, so that they form the peripheral
part of the interbank network and their size in terms of net worth is negatively
correlated with their degree in the deposits networks. At the opposite those
banks with a high degree in the credit market have few links with depositors but
are densely connected in the interbank network, being the core. They borrow
funds from the peripheral banks and their size is positively correlated with their
degree in the firm-bank credit market. Fig. 21 and Tab.s 7 and 8 show the
distribution of banks’ out-degrees, network statistics and the cross-correlation
of out-degrees with selected variables. The statistics for the interbank network
are in Tab. 2 in Sect. 3, where the reference connectivity level employed in the
simulations is d4.
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Figure 21: Loglog plot of the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of banks’ out-degrees on
deposits and credit networks.
hb fb credit
Avg degree 15 5 22.64
Median degree 2 2 8
Max degree 113 28 113
Number of nodes 750 250 1132
Table 7: Descriptive statistics for the households-banks deposits network (hb), firms-banks
deposits network (fb) and firms-banks credit network (credit).
hb fb credit ib credit
volume
ib lend ib borr bank
size
hb 1.000 0.965 -0.386 -0.286 -0.400 0.513 -0.290 -0.269
(1.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
fb 0.965 1.000 -0.410 -0.302 -0.428 0.527 -0.308 -0.300
(0.000) (1.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
credit -0.386 -0.410 1.000 0.941 0.933 -0.299 0.916 0.903
(0.000) (0.000) (1.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ib -0.286 -0.302 0.941 1.000 0.863 -0.209 0.923 0.842
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (1.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
credit volume -0.400 -0.428 0.933 0.863 1.000 -0.289 0.914 0.982
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (1.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ib lend 0.513 0.527 -0.299 -0.209 -0.289 1.000 -0.216 -0.204
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (1.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ib borr -0.290 -0.308 0.916 0.923 0.914 -0.216 1.000 0.901
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (1.000) (0.000)
bank size -0.269 -0.300 0.903 0.842 0.982 -0.204 0.901 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (1.000)
Table 8: Cross-correlation of selected network-related variables (p-values in parenthesis).
The first set of variables represents the total out-degree of each bank in the household-bank
deposits network (hb), firm-bank deposit network (fb), firm-bank credit network (credit) and
interbank network (ib).
The second set represents total credit lent by each bank (credit volume), interbank lending
(ib lend) and borrowing (ib borr) and the size of banks (bank size) measured by their net
worth. Correlations are computed on the cumulated normalized values of each bank over each
simulation, for 10 Monte Carlo repetitions.
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